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Abstract
The ”General-Self-Control-Preference” model introduced by Noor and Takeoka (2010) allows to take
into account non linear costs of Self-Control. In this paper we extend this theory to situations in which
a decision-maker faces ambiguity. We focus on the fact that lack of information is a potential source of
temptation. Indeed lack of information doesn’t allow the decision-maker to put a probability measure
on uncertain events. Our basic hypothesis is that, in ambiguous situation, individuals are not confident
enough about their beliefs and could therefore be tempted to use other beliefs to evaluate the alterna-
tives in the second period. We study a two period model where ex ante dominated choice may tempt the
decision-maker in the second period. Individuals have preferences over sets of alternatives that represent
second period choices. We provide a Choice-Theoretic model where the ex ante belief is a probability
measure whereas ex post belief is a Choquet-capacity, in order to take into account individual attitudes
towards ambiguity in the second period.
KEYWORDS: Temptation, Self-control, Ambiguity, Choquet-Expected-Utility, Comonotonic-Temptation-
Independence.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D81.
1 Introduction
In most economic situations, individuals take their decisions in an ambiguous environment. As shown by
the Ellsberg’s Paradox, Savage’s theory cannot model preferences with a non neutrality towards ambiguity.
During the last two decades, the decision theorists have provided many models to rationalize behaviors
under ambiguity. Loosely speaking, the main explanation from these theories is that the lack of objective
information prevents a precise measurement of the likelihood of an event. However, while beliefs are based on
an imprecise measure, they are stable across time. We provide an axiomatic foundation for the preferences
of the agents with unstable beliefs under ambiguity.
As noted by Epstein and Kopylov (2007), aversion to ambiguity in the standard model is static and doesn’t
capture the notion of a belief that can change over time. Yet, an ambiguous context suggests that individuals
could doubt the reliability of their beliefs and so could not have a definitive opinion upon the realization of
the states of the world. To take into account the variation of beliefs even in the absence of new information,
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Epstein and Kopylov (2007) combine the model of ambiguity with the model of temptation of Gul and
Pesendorfer (2001, henceforth GP). In the GP model, the choice is not determined by an unique preference
ordering: the choices are the aggregated result of two conflicting orderings: a temptation preference that
captures the agent’s desires, and a normative preference1 that captures his view of what choices he should
make. This duality is also presents for choices under uncertainty. Since there are not enough objective
information to describe likelihoods on the states of the world, we can think that individuals are not influenced
solely by their rational beliefs to make a choice. Indeed emotions such as fear, anxiety, or excitation cannot
be completely eliminated by the beliefs based upon an imprecise measure. Hence, it seems that beliefs are
constituted by two conflicting components: a part analyzing the uncertainty of the situation and the other
part representing a more immediate perception of reality. The first part is the normative component of
beliefs while the second part can be understood as an emotional component.
We must still define what we mean by normative beliefs. As shown by Noor (2011), the temporal distance
between the time of choice and the time of the consequences of this choice is fundamental in order to separate
the normative preference and temptation preferences. So, under ambiguity the normative belief could be
revealed when an agent is some time away from the consequences of his choice2. Inversely the temporal
proximity increases the weight of tempting beliefs in the decision-making.
In order to capture the effect of temporal proximity on choices under ambiguity we adopt the theoretical
framework defined in Epstein and Kopylov (2007): uncertainty is described by a finite states space S, and
the decision problem occurs in three steps. A menu of Anscombe-Aumann acts is chosen in the first step.
In the second step the agent chooses an act in the menu selected in the initial step. In the third step, a
state of the world is realized and payoffs are received. For example, this framework allows to interpret the
following situation: In the the first period, the agent can choose between the option a and the menu {a, b}.
If the option a is selected, then when the second period comes, the decision maker have no other choice but
to conserve the option a. Hence the pression of temporal proximity is canceled out since the decision cannot
deviate of her initial choice. In the other hand, if the menu {a, b} is choosed, then the decision maker still
have the possibility to choose a or b in the second period, therefore the decision is made while the pression of
temporal proximity is strong. Under ambiguity, if we observe the ranking {a}  {a, b}, then we can interpret
this choice in the following way: during the first period the reasonable belief’s of the decision maker implies
that the option a is preferable to the option b, nevertheless if he chooses the menu {a, b}, then, during the
second period the tempting belief’s leads the decision maker to choose option b. In other words, the choice
of {a, b} implies a risk to deviate from the initial choice. Now, we can provide an answer to the following
legitimate question: why individuals tend to modify their beliefs between the ex-ante and the ex post choice,
1For a behavioral fundation of this interpretation see Noor 2011.
2We don’t provide a behavioral foundation of this interpretation in our formal analyse, however most experimental evidences
confirm this interpretation (see e.g Armor and Taylor (2002) and Trope and Liberman (2003))
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while the uncertainty upon the situation does not change? In an ambiguous situation, a decision-maker is
not confident enough about his belief and could therefore be tempted to use other beliefs in order to evaluate
the alternatives in the second period. For instance, a well know stylized fact in psychology is that individuals
tend to lose confidence in their prospects when they approach the ”moment of truth” (see e.g Gilovich and
al. 1993). We focus on the fact that lack of information is a potential source of temptation.
By mixing the temptation model of GP et Maxmin-Expected-Utility, Epstein and Kopylov axiomatize
the following utility function:
W (A) = max
f∈A
{
EU(f)− k
(
max
g∈A
MEU(·)−MEU(f)
)}
where
MEU(f) := min
q∈Q
∫
S
u(f(s))dq(s) and EU(f) =
∫
S
u(f)dp
where Q is a closed convex set of probability, and p is a probability. The function EU represents the
normative preference while MEU(f) represents the tempting ranking. The function
c(g, f) = k
(
max
g∈A
MEU(·)−MEU(f)
)
describe the function of self-control, that is, c(f, g) measure, in utility term, the frustration caused by the
adherence to the initial choice in the presence of an tempting alternative.
Although our model has an undeniable affiliation with the model of Epstein and Kopylov, we differ on
two key points:
1) Self-Control Cost
In our model, the cost of Self-Control is not necessarily linear. To achieve this, we extend the General-
Self-Control-Preference of Noor and Takeoka under a framework allowing to take into account the presence
of ambiguity. The non linearity of Self-Control-Cost allows to capture a broader pattern of preferences
during the ex-post choice, namely what act chooses an agent in the menu selected ex-ante. For instance,
as shown by Noor and Takeoka (2010), non linear Self-Control explains some form of Menu-Dependence.
Under ambiguous context, this assumption seems relevant. Indeed the agents could have a reaction towards
ambiguity which depends of the available choices.
2) The tempting Utility
In our model, the tempting preferences is represented by the Choquet-Expected-Utility Model (henceforth
CEU) allowing to take into account individual attitudes towards ambiguity in the second period. Formally:
let f and g two AA acts such that f is prefered ex-ante to g, then g is tempting for f if and only if
CEU(g) > CEU(f). An interesting particular case of CEU-temptation ranking is equal to the Hurwicz
criterion’s:
CEU(f) = αmin
s∈S
u(f(s)) + (1− α) max
s∈S
u(f(s))
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where α ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, the temptation-ranking puts focus uniquely on the extreme outcomes,
suggesting that the agent has in mind an over reaction to uncertainty during the ex-post choice. Hence the
Choquet-Expected-Utility is not limited to an extreme pessimism in the second period of choice.
The article starts with the description of the Setup in section 2. In Section 3 we dress the design of the
value of the menus and we propose and discuss an axiomatic foundation for the choice-theoretic model in
section 3.2. In section 4 we announce the representation results. We conclude this paper in section 5. The
proof are relayed in appendix.
2 Setup
Consider a finite set S of states of nature, 2S is the set of subsets of S called events, and Y = 4(X) is the
set of probability measures on the Borel σ-algebra of X, where X is a compact metric space of outcomes.
We assume that Y is embedded with the weak convergence topology, hence Y is compact and metrizable3.
We denote by F the set of all Ascombe-Aumann (AA) acts: the set of all finite valued 2S-measurable
functions f : S → Y . Given any y ∈ Y , with the usual abuse of notation denote y ∈ F , the constant
act such that y(s) = y for all s ∈ S, thus we identify Y with the subset of constant acts in F . For every
f, g ∈ F and α ∈ [0, 1] as usual we denote by αf + (1 − α)g (fαg for short) the act in F , which yields
αf(s) + (1−α)g(s) ∈ Y , for every s ∈ S. Hence we can derive the topology of F from the Cartesian product
of metric spaces YS ,
d(f, g) = sup
s∈S
dY (f(s), g(s)) (1)
with f, g ∈ F and where dY (f(s), g(s)) is the metric generated by the weak convergence topology on Y.
Since Y is a compact space, the Tychonoff theorem implies that F is also a compact space. The objects of
our analyze are the compact subsets of F . LetM be the set of nonempty compact subsets of F . We endow
M with the topology generated by the Haussdorf metric
dM(A,B) := max
{
sup
f∈A
inf
g∈B
d(f, g), sup
g∈B
inf
f∈A
d(f, g)
}
. (2)
Futhermore since F is a compact space with the metric d, M is also a compact space with the metric dM.4
3 Model
3.1 Utility
The General-Self-Control-Preference model accommodates temptation with not necessarily linear Self-Control
costs by keeping Set-Betweenness. The main motivation of this weakening is to capture uphill self-control
retaining the essential idea of the GP model: in situations where there exists tempting alternatives an
3See Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 15.11
4See Kopylov (2009)
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individual could deviate of her ”normative preference”. The agent want to resist to temptation must to
use her self-control, but this resistance implies a frustration which is represented by an opportunity costs.
Therefore if the agent maintains her initial choice, the utility of the best alternative is decreased by the
cost of self-control. If the frustration due to the temptation resistance is too strong, the agent is constrain
to cede to temptation and chooses a dominated alternative. In order to avoid costs of self-control caused
by temptation, the agent chooses during first period, a menu whitout tempting alternatives. This explains
a preference for commitment in the ex-ante choice. Hence the utility of menu A is write in GP model as
follows
U(A) = max
f∈A
{u(f)− (max
g∈A
v(g)− v(f))}
where u is a von Neuman utility representing the ”normative preference” and v is a von Neuman utility
representing the temptation ranking. The cost of self-control is evaluated according to the most tempting
alternative in the menu A: maxg∈A v(g) − v(f). Noor and Takeoka allow to keep this interpretation about
the preference commitment, but in their theory the value of a menu A is represented by an ”indirect utility”
function:
U(A) = max
f∈A
{u(f)− c(f,max
g∈A
v(g))}
where c(f,maxg∈A v(g)) is strictly increasing and positive function in its second argument. Moreover the
function c satisfied two minimal features of Self-Control cost:
- a) c (f, v(g)) > 0⇒ v(g) > v(f). This means that the self- control cost is positive only when self-control
is exerted.
- b) u(f) > u(g) and v(g) > v(f) ⇒ c (f, v(g)) > 0. This means that the self-control cost of resisting
temptation is strictly positive.
To better capture the impact of ambiguity on ex-post decisions, we represent Temptation-utility with
Choquet-Expected-Utility criterion. Although it is most often as modeling non neutrality ambiguity, the
Choquet-Expected-Utility (CEU) is sometimes interpreted in terms of over or under reaction to uncertainty,
since the agent chooses an action with a subjective perception of uncertainty represented by a capacity. As
well know, a capacity is a normalized monotone set function. Since S is finite, CEU can be write as:∫
S
u(f)dυ =
m∑
j=1
(u(xj)− u(xj+1)) υ
(
j⋃
i
Ei
)
(3)
for all acts f ∈ F such that u(x1) > · · · > u(xm) > 0.
In this paper we extend the Noor and Takeoka model’s of temptation to situations where a Decision Maker
is facing ambiguity. Namely in our model the value of menu of Anscombe-Aumann acts A is formulated as
follows:
U(A) = max
f∈A
{EU(f)− c(f,max
g∈A
CEU(·))}
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where EU(·) is the classical SEU-Model, and the function c sastified a) and b). We can remark that both
subjective and objective probabilities are present in the model but they are treated differently: for simplicity
we assume that objective lotteries are not a source of temptation. Therefore the function of Self-Control
cost admits a supplementary property:
- c) {f(s)} ∼ {f ′(s)} and {g(s)} ∼ {g′(s)} for all s ∈ S ⇒ c (f, CEU(g)) = c (f ′, CEU(g′)).
This simply says that if f, f ′ are equivalents from lotteries point of view, and identically for g, g′, then there
is not additionally cost of Self-Control. To resume, our model of utility has the form:
Definition 1 (Choquet General Self Control Preference). We say that < has Choquet General Self-Control
Preference if A < B ⇔W (A) >W (B) where W :M→ R is defining in the following way
W (A) = max
f∈A
{∑
s∈S
µ(s)u(f(s))− c
(
f,max
g∈A
∫
S
u(g(s))dυ(s)
)}
where µ : 2S → [0, 1] is a probability, υ : 2S → [0, 1] is a capacity, u : Y → R is a continuous function
and c : F × CEU (F) → R+ is a continuous function that is weakly increasing in its second argument and
satisfies a), b) and c).
3.2 Axioms
We suppose that the DM is sophisticated, namely the agent understands when choosing a menu at the ex
post stage, she will choose an act from that menu, moreover, she anticipates that the passage of time will
have an effect on her belief. Hence the menu A is chosen according to < on M in ex-ante. The first axiom
is standard:
A1 (Weak Order): < on M is complete, transitive and non-trivial.
A2 (Continuity): For each A ∈M, {B ∈M : B < A} and {B ∈M : A < B} are closed sets.
A3 (Commitment-Independence): For all f, g, h ∈ F , and for all α ∈ (0, 1),
{f} < {g} ⇔ {αf + (1− α)h} < {αg + (1− α)h}
A2 provides the continuity of preferences in the classical sense. Axioms A1-A3 imply by a standard
result an Expected Utility representation over singletons, in other words the DM is ambiguity neutral for
singletons.
A4 (Set-Betweenness): For all A,B ∈M, A < B ⇒ A < A ∪B < B
The interpretation of this axiom is standard when it is assumed that the DM is sophisticated. For
instance if the menu A is preferred to menu B, then A  A ∪ B reveals that B contains some acts which
are source of temptation. In this case, the commitment in ex-ante period allows to avoid either the cost of
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self-control or either to cede at the tempting alternatives. Following the above interpretation (suggest e.g by
Noor and Takeoka) for the particular case in which A = {f}, A ∪B = {f, g} and B = {g}, we can infer if g
is a tempting act when f is the best choice with respect to the normative preference. Since the ranking of
singletons {f} < {g} reveals the normative preference, the ranking {f}  {f, g} suggests that the presence
of g could lead the decision maker to deviate of her optimal choice. Inversely {f} ∼ {f, g} suggests that g
doesn’t represents an tempting alternative for the DM. Noor and Takeoka (2010) show that in this context,
a supplementary axiom must be imposed: there is no temptation-reversal when two acts are mixed with a
common act. During the ex-ante choice, if the DM reveals that g tempts f , then αg + (1 − α)h should be
also an alternative which tempts αf + (1− α)h. More formally:
Definition 2 (Temptation-Independence). For all acts f, g, h ∈ F , if {f}  {g} then for any α ∈ (0, 1), (i)
and (ii) holds:
(i) {f}  {f, g} ⇒ {αf + (1− α)h}  {αf + (1− α)h, αg + (1− α)h}
(ii) {f} ∼ {f, g} ⇒ {αf + (1− α)h} ∼ {αf + (1− α)h, αg + (1− α)h}.
This assumption needs more discussion. The main goal of our model is to emphasize the link between
ambiguity perception and time. However, Temptation-Independence is not appealing under ambiguity. To
illustrate how the anticipation of ex-post ambiguous-belief can lead to a violation of Temptation Indepen-
dence, we focus on two example.
EXAMPLE 1: ex-post Optimism.
Suppose the DM anticipates that she will attracted by ambiguity when she chooses an act in the menu
selected ex-ante. For concreteness, imagine that the DM is face to an Ellsberg urn with 30 red balls and
60 green or yellows balls. There is two bets: f = (100, R; 0, G; 0, Y ) and g = (0, R; 110, G; 0, Y ). She must
choose ex-ante between {f}, {g} or {f, g}. If {f}  {g}, we can conclude that f is better than g with
respect to her normative belief’s. Clearly in our example f is an unambiguous act whereas g is ambiguous
act. So, the expected payoffs of f is based on precise probability, while the expected payoffs of g are by
definition unknown. Since the DM is attracted by ambiguity in the second period, it’s seems plausible that
{f}  {f, g}. Because the payoff of g(G) is more important than f(R) , she could be tempted to overestimate
the probability of the event G, and to deviate of her best choice in the second period if the menu {f, g} is
chosen during first period. In order to cancel the effect of temptation she commits in her best choice {f}.
Now suppose the two following bets: f ′ = (50, R; 5, G; 60, Y ) and g′ = (0, R; 60, G; 60, Y ). We can remark
that f ′ = 12f +
1
2h and g
′ = 12g +
1
2h, with h = (0, R; 10, G; 120, Y ). From Singleton-Independence we have
{f ′}  {g′}, but the dominated bets g′ is not ambiguous. Therefore the commitment towards {f ′} ex-ante
is superfluous and the following ranking should be observed: {f ′} ∼ {f ′, g′}.♦
EXAMPLE 2: ex-post Pessimism.
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Suppose the DM anticipates that she will averse towards ambiguity when she chooses an act in the menu
selected ex-ante. There is two bets: f = (100, R; 0, G; 0, Y ) and g = (0, R; 0, G; 110, Y ). As in Example 1, she
must choose ex-ante between {f}, {g} or {f, g}. If {g}  {f}, we can conclude that g is better than f with
respect to her normative belief’s. Clearly in our example f is an unambiguous act whereas g is ambiguous
act. Since the DM is averse towards ambiguity in the second period, it’s seems plausible that {g}  {g, f}:
thought the payoff of g(Y ) is more important than f(R), she could be tempted to underestimate the proba-
bility of the event Y , leading the DM to choose f in the second period in order to avoid the ambiguous act.
Now suppose the two following bets: f ′ = (50, R; 60, G; 5, Y ) and g′ = (0, R; 60, G; 60, Y ). We can remark
that f ′ = 12f +
1
2h and g
′ = 12g +
1
2h, with h = (0, R; 120, G; 10, Y ). From Singleton-Independence we have
{g′}  {f ′}, but the best choice g′ is not ambiguous. Therefore f ′ is not attractive for the DM, and the
commitment towards {g′} ex-ante is not necessarly. In other word we get {g′} ∼ {g′, f ′}.♦
In Example 1 and 2, temptation reversal arises because h is not comonotone to f and g. To better capture
the impact of ex-post ambiguity on decisions, it’s seems more realistic to restrict Temptation-Independence
for comonotonic acts.5 More formally:
A5 (Comonotonic-Temptation-Independence): If f, g, h ∈ F are pairwise comonotonic and {f}  {g}, then
Temptation-Independence holds.
A5 highly suggests that temptation can be represented by an CEU criterion. By analogy with respect
to a classical preference relation, it appears that we can interpret temptation as a binary relation on F :
Definition 3 (Temptation relation). Let T and NT two binary relations on F . We say that for all f, g ∈ F
- gTf (g tempts f) if {f}  {f, g} < {g}
- gNTf (g no tempts f) if {f} ∼ {f, g}  {g}.
Nevertheless, we can note that temptation relation is not complete: if {f} ∼ {g} by definition we cannot
say if g tempts or doesn’t tempts f . Moreover, A4 doesn’t implies transitivity:
gTf and hTg ; hTf
In fact, if gTf and hTg, then {f}  {h}, therefore from A4 we get
{f}  {f, h} < {h} or {f} ∼ {f, h}  {h}.
In other words if g tempts f and h tempts g, then necessarily {f} < {f, h}. Thus it’s difficult to draw an
analogy between the temptation relation and a classical preference relation. In the absence of the transitivity
property on temptation relation, Noor and Takeoka strengthens Temptation-Independence in order to achieve
a binary relation more structured.
5Two acts f and g are say comonotonics if and only if (f(s)− f(s′))(g(s)− g(s′)) > 0 for all s, s′ ∈ S.
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Definition 4 (Temptation-Convexity). For f, g, h ∈ F if {f}  {g}, {g′}, then for any α ∈ [0, 1], (i) and
(ii) holds:
(i) {f}  {f, g} and {f}  {f, g′} ⇒ {f}  {f, αg + (1− α)g′}
(ii) {f} ∼ {f, g} and {f} ∼ {f, g′} ⇒ {f} ∼ {f, αg + (1− α)g′}.
This axiom simply says that if g and g′ tempt f , then any mixture of g and g′ tempts f . A stronger
form of this property is central to capture temptation ranking: it can be formulated as follows:
Definition 5 (Strong-Temptation-Convexity). For f, f ′, g, g′ ∈ F if {f}  {g}, {f ′}  {g′} then for any
α ∈ (0, 1) (i) and (ii) holds:
(i) {f}  {f, g} and {f ′}  {f ′, g′} ⇒ {αf + (1− α)f ′}  {αf + (1− α)f ′, αg + (1− α)g′}.
(ii) {f} ∼ {f, g} and {f ′} ∼ {f ′, g′} ⇒ {αf + (1− α)f ′} ∼ {αf + (1− α)f ′, αg + (1− α)g′}.
Noor and Takeoka (2011) show that if Temptation-Independence holds then Temptation-Convexity and
Strong-Temptation-Convexity are in fact equivalent. According to the weakening of Temptation-Independence
we must modifying also Temptation-Convexity and Strong-Temptation-Convexity for they be adapted to an
ambiguous context. More precisely, we define an comonotonic cone by the following set:
Cρ :=
{
f ∈ F : f(sρ(1)) 4 f(sρ(2)) 4 . . . 4 f(sρ(S))
}
where ρ is any permutation of S. We maintain Temptation-Convexity only if f, g, g′ lie in the same comono-
tonic cone, and Strong-Temptation-Convexity holds only if
- f and f ′ are comonotonic
- g and g′ are comonotonic
- f, f ′ doesn’t lie to the same comonotonic cone that g and g′.
However, with our weakening of Temptation-Independence and of Temptation-Convexity we cannot derive
the Strong-Temptation-Convexity axiom as in the paper of Noor and Takeoka. Hence we must postulate the
following axiom:
A6 (Comonotonic-Temptation-Convexity): For f, f ′ comonotonic, and g, g′ comonotonic if {f}  {g}, {f ′} 
{g′} then for any α ∈ (0, 1) (i) and (ii) holds:
(i) {f}  {f, g} and {f ′}  {f ′, g′} ⇒ {αf + (1− α)f ′}  {αf + (1− α)f ′, αg + (1− α)g′}.
(ii) {f} ∼ {f, g} and {f ′} ∼ {f ′, g′} ⇒ {αf + (1− α)f ′} ∼ {αf + (1− α)f ′, αg + (1− α)g′}.
A6’ (Comonotonic-Temptation-Convexity): Let f, f ′, g, g′ ∈ F .
9
(i) If {f}  {g}, {g′} and f, g, g′ ∈ Cρ, then Temptation-Convexity holds
(ii) Let {f}  {g}, {f ′}  {g′} such that f, f ′ ∈ Cρ and g, g′ ∈ Cρˆ, if and ρ 6= ρˆ, then Strong-Temptation-
Convexity holds.
From a Behavioral point of view, A6 is not very different to A5. We can interpreted A6 as follows: in the
classical model of temptation, if Independence holds for any menus, namely
A < B ⇒ αA+ (1− α)C < αB + (1− α)C
then Kopylov (2009.b)6 show that A ∼ co(A), where co(·) is the convex hull of any set. This means that a
menu is indifferent with respect to it properly randomization. In a ambiguous context, we can understood
A6 as a suitably restriction of randomization to comonotone acts: there is no temptation reversal if the
randomization is suitably effected according to (i) and (ii) of A6.
The next axiom means that subjective acts and lotteries are treated differently: while the agent chooses
new beliefs ex post about her subjective uncertainty, she does not modify her preference on lotteries during
the three period. We consider lotteries as an component of taste and for simplicity we suppose that taste
are constant across time. This leads to the following axioms:
A7 (Monotonic-Strategic-Rationality): If f, g ∈ F and f(s) < g(s) for all s ∈ S then {f} ∼ {f, g} < {g}.
Moreover if for all i = 1, . . . , n <∞, fi(s) ∼ f ′i(s) for all s ∈ S, then
⋃n
i=1{fi} ∼
⋃n
i=1{f ′i}.
If the evaluation of a lottery does not depend on the state, then a dominating act should be preferred
under commitment. Similarly, if f dominates g, we would not expect f to be tempted by g. The second part
of axiom say that if {f(s)} ∼ {f ′(s)}, {g(s)} ∼ {g′(s)} for all s ∈ S, then {f, g} ∼ {f ′, g′}. This property
holds for menus A and B that have same number of acts.
A8 (Temptation-Aversion): For any f, g, h ∈ F if {f}  {f, g}  {g} then if {h}  {h, g} or {g} ∼ {g, h} 
{h} implies that {f, h} < {f, g}.
This axiom means that if g is more tempting than h, then agents prefer the menu with the less tempting
alterntive: {f, h} < {f, g}.
4 Representation Results
4.1 Capture commitment under Ambiguity
In this section, we introduce the representation of the temptation relation by an Choquet-Expected-Utility.
6See also Dekel and al (2001)
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Theorem 1. If < on M satisfies A1-A4 and A7 with {f}  {g} then (i) and (ii) are equivalents:
(i) < satisfies A5 and A6
(ii) There exists a unique capacity υ : 2S → [0, 1] and a Choquet integral I : F → R such that
{f}  {f, g} ⇔ I(g) =
∫
S
u(g)dυ > I(f) =
∫
S
u(f)dυ (4)
where u : Y → R is increasing, continuous, mixture linear and unique up to affine transformation.
Proof. See Appendix
A brief outline of the proof of theorem 1:
We adopt a geometrical proof for this theorem. Since S is finite we use the method of piecewise linear
integral on comonotonic cone to built an Choquet integral: firstly we represent the temptation relation by
a linear form on all comonotonic cones, secondly the representation are extended entire domain. In order
to represent the temptation relation on each comonotonic cone, we use the Hyperplan Theorem. Hence
we identify TF on F to TB(u) on B(u), where B(u) is the set of all function ϕ : S → R such that
u(y∗) 6 ϕ(s) 6 u(y∗)7. Clearly, B(u) generates RS . Therefore we can apply the Hyperplan Separation
Theorem, because B(u) is a subset of vectorial space. Next, the proof take places in three stages:
• Applying the Hyperplan Separation to each comonotonic cone denoted Cρ where ρ is a permutation of
S, we prove the existence of probability vector representing the temptation relation for all act. The proof of
the unicity of the probability is slightly different as usual. Firstly we show that for any act f in Cρ and g
in Cρ, there exists a unique probability such that {f}  {f, g} if and only if Epiρf (g) > Epiρf (f). Secondly we
show that for any f, g ∈ Cρ, we have necessarly piρf = piρg . Hence for each Cρ, the temptation-relation is well
represented by
{f}  {f, g} ⇔ Epiρ(g) > Epiρ(f),
where f, g ∈ Cρ.
• In the classical representation of comonotone preferences, since any constant act lies in all comonotonic
cones, with a standard argument of transitivity, we can easily link all the comonotone cones between them,
and obtain an Choquet Integral. However, in our case, the transitivity of temptation relation doesn’t holds,
for instance if f ∈ Cρ and g, h ∈ Cρˆ, then gTf and hTg ; hTf . Hence we must built an Choquet Integral
without transitivity. We argue as follow: let Cρ and Cρˆ and fix any f ∈ Cρ. We define the two following
sets:
{g ∈ Cρˆ : gTf or fNTg} and {g ∈ Cρˆ : gNTf or fTg}.
7y∗ and y∗ are the worst and the best loteries respectively.
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From A6 we show that this sets are convex and disjoint. So we can apply the Hyperplan Theorem, an deduce
the existence of probability vector γρˆf which represents the temptation relation at any f ∈ Cρ, namely there
exists a ∈ R such that:
{f}  {f, g} ⇔ Eγρˆf (g) > a,
where g ∈ Cρˆ. By a similar proof of stage 1 we show the unicity of the probability vector, namely γρˆf = γρˆf ′
for all f, f ′ ∈ Cρ. Next we show that a = Epiρ(f). Hence we get
{f}  {f, g} ⇔ Eγρˆ(g) > Epiρ(f).
• Now, we must show that
{f}  {f, g} ⇔ Epiρˆ(g) > Epiρ(f). (5)
The mainly argument is to show that we have necessarily piρˆ = γρˆ, and we obtain the desired result. The
building of the Choquet integral with (6) derive from standard arguments (see e.g Ryan 2009; Chateauneuf,
Kast and Lapied 2001).♦
Because we have assumed that the individual is neutral towards ambiguity for singleton in the ex ante
stage, the preference for commitment or equivalently anticipation of temptation in the ex post stage can be
interpreted as a increasing sensitivity towards ambiguity when the third stage approaches. We specify the
temptation utility as follow:
Definition 6. Let f, g ∈ F , we say that f and g are correlated on Extreme outcomes (CEO) if C(f) = C(g)
and C(f) = C(g), where
C(f) := {s ∈ S : {f(s′)} < {f(s)}, ∀s′ ∈ S}
C(f) := {s ∈ S : {f(s′)} 4 {f(s)}, ∀s′ ∈ S}.
Definition 7. We say that υ is Hurwicz capacity if υ(∅) = 0, υ(S) = 1 and for any E ⊂ S, υ(E) = α.
A5’ (H-Temptation): For f, g ∈ F , if f, g, h are CEO then
(i) {f}  {f, g} ⇔ {αf + (1− α)h}  {αf + (1− α)h, αg + (1− α)h}
(ii) {f} ∼ {f, g} ⇔ {αf + (1− α)h} ∼ {αf + (1− α)h, αg + (1− α)h}
Proposition 1. If < on M satisfies A1-A7 then (i) and (ii) are equivalents:
(i) < satisfies A5’
(ii) υ is a Hurwicz capacity
Proof. See Appendix.
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A5” (Ambiguity aversion-Temptation): For f, g, h ∈ F if {f} ∼ {f, g} and {f} ∼ {f, h} then for any
α ∈ (0, 1), {f} < {f, αg + (1− α)h}.
Proposition 2. If < on M satisfies A1-A7 then (i) and (ii) are equivalents:
(i) < satisfies A5”
(ii) υ is a convex capacity
Proof. See Appendix.
A5”’ (Ambiguity Loving-Temptation): For f, g, h ∈ F , if {f}  {f, g} and {f}  {f, h} then for any
α ∈ (0, 1), {f} < {f, αf + (1− α)g}.
Proposition 3. If < on M satisfies A1-A7 then (i) and (ii) are equivalents:
(i) < satisfies A5”’
(ii) υ is a concave capacity
Proof. See Appendix.
4.2 Representation Theorem
Our main result is that the axioms on menus characterize the functional form described in Section 3.1. We
say < is non degenerate if there exists f, g ∈ F such that {f}  {f, g}  {g}.
Theorem 2. The binary relation < on M(F) is represented by a Choquet-General-Self-Control-Preference
if and only if < satisfies A1-A8. Suppose that (u, µ, υ, c) and (u′, µ′, υ′, c′) are both representation of a non
degenerate Choquet-General-Self-Control. Then there exists α > 0 and β ∈ R such that u′ = αu+β, µ = µ′,
and υ = υ′. Moreover, c′(f, l) = αc(f, (l − β)/α) on the set:{
(f, l)
∣∣∣∣ ∫
S
u′(f)dυ > l or {f}  {f, g}  {g} for some g with
∫
S
u′(g)dυ = l
}
.
Proof. See appendix 3.3
While the Choquet-General-Self-Control-Preference is a representation for an ex-ante preference over
menus, it suggests that ex-post choice is given by the choice correspondance defined by
C(A) := arg max
f∈A
{∑
s∈S
µ(s)u(f(s))− c
(
f,max
g∈A
∫
S
u(g(s))dυ(s)
)}
.
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5 Concluding remarks
To conclude, we describe some variation of the above model.
Ambiguity sensitivity in ex-ante stage
We can think that to represent the singletons-preference by a SEU is not very realistic. Indeed why don’t
the agents have Ellsberg preferences when the consequences of choice are delayed? We can easily replace the
singleton-independence by
{f}  {g} ⇔ α{f}+ (1− α)h  α{g}+ (1− α){h}
when f, g and h are pairwise comonotonic. Hence we should get:
W (A) = max
f∈A
{∫
S
u(f)dυ − c
(
f,max
f∈A
∫
S
u(g(s))dρ
)}
where υ, ρ are capacities. We could argue that ex-ante, the agents have a small sensitivity to ambiguity and
a huge sensitivity to ambiguity during the ex-post choice. A generalization to a broader class of criterion,
such as the MEU for singletons is, in our opinion also possible.
Random-Strotz-Utility under Ambiguity
Chatterjee and Krishna (2008) have axiomatized under risk the following model:
U(A) := αmax
f∈A
u(f) + (1− α) max
g∗∈Bv(A)
u(g∗)
where Bv(A) := {f ∈ A | f ∈ arg maxg∈A v(·)}. The theorem of representation of temptation in Section
4.1 is independent of the General-Self-Control model and could be used to model a Random-Strotz-Utility
under ambiguity, where the temptation-utility is a CEU criterion and not a classical von Neuman-utility.
Appendix 1: Related Materials
1.1 Hyperplan separation theorem
Theorem (Aliprentis and Border, p.276). In a finite dimensional vector space, any two disjoint convex sets
can be properly separated by a nonzero linear functional.
Theorem (Aliprentis and Border, p.279). In a finite dimensional vector space two nonempty convex sets
can be properly separated if and only if their relative interiors are disjoints.
Theorem (Aliprentis and Border, p.279). Let C be a nonempty convex subset of a finite dimensional Haus-
dorff space and let x belong to C. Then there is a linear functional properly supporting C at x if and only if
x /∈ ri (C).
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1.2 Hausdorff metric
Recall thatM(F) is the set of compact menus therefore we can write the Hausdorrf metric in the following
way
dM(A,B) := max
{
max
x∈B
d(x,A),max
x∈A
d(x,B)
}
(6)
where d(f,A) = ming∈A d(f, g). Denote by N(g) and N({f, g}) the -neighborhood of g and {f, g} respec-
tively where  > 0.
Claim 1. If limn→∞ gn = g, then {f, gn} → {f, g} when n→∞.
Proof: We say that An → A in Hausdorff metric if dM(An, A) → 0 when n → ∞. Pick any binary menus
in M(F), say {f, g}. Hence we have to show that if limn→∞ gn = g then dM({f, g}}, {f, gn}) → 0 when
n→∞. We have for all n
maxx∈{f,gn} d(x, {f, g}) = max{min{d(f, f), d(f, g)},min{d(gn, g), d(gn, f)}}.
By definition min{d(f, f), d(f, g)} = 0 and min{d(gn, f), d(gn, g)} → 0 when n → ∞. Therefore when
n→∞ we get maxx∈{f,gn} d(x, {f, g})→ 0. The same result holds for maxx∈{f,g} d(x, {f, gn}). Hence when
n→∞, we get
dM({f, g}, {f, gn}) = max
{
max
x∈{f,gn}
d(x, {f, g})→ 0, max
x∈{f,g}
d(x, {f, g′})→ 0
}
→ 0,
as desired.
Appendix 2: Proof of Theorem 1
2.1 Preliminary results
Lemma 1. If < satisfies A1-A3, there exists an affine functions u : Y → R such for all x, z ∈ Y , x < z ⇔
u(x) > u(z).
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of von-Neumann theorem since the independence axiom for constant
act is implied by Commitment-Independence.
Lemma 2. If < on M satisfies A1-A4 and A7 then given u : Y → R of lemma 1, there exists a continuous
function T :M(F)→ R such that
(i) For A ∈M(Y ), T (A) = maxyi∈A u(yi) and {yi} < {yj} ⇔ T ({yi}) > T ({yj}).
(ii) For all A,B ∈M A < B ⇔ T (A) > T (B), and for all f, g ∈ F {f} < {g} ⇔ T ({f}) > T ({g}).
Proof. For all constant act A7 holds, hence {yi} < {yj} ⇒ {yi} ∼ {yi, yj}. By lemma 1 with T ({yi}) = u(yi)
we can put T ({yi}) = T ({yi, yj}) > T ({yj}) and by a recurrence argument (i) holds. Turn to (ii), by A4
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and A7 {y∗} < A < {y∗}8, and by A2 {{f} ∈ M : {f} < A} and {{f} ∈ M : A < {f}} are closed set.
Thus there exists a unique α ∈ [0, 1] such that {αAy∗ + (1 − αA)y∗} ∼ A. Put T (A) = αA and (ii) holds.
Moreover T is continuous because < satisfies continuity and hence the set {A ∈ M : T (A) > γ} and
{A ∈M : T (A) 6 γ} are closed for all γ ∈ R.
We let B denote the set of real-valued 2S-measurable functions, or equivalently the vector space generated
by characteristics functions 1A of the events A ∈ 2S . If f ∈ F and u : Y → R, we denote by ϕ = u(f) the
element of B defined by u(f)(s) = u(f(s)) for all s ∈ S. Given a compact interval K in the real line, we
denote by B(K) the subset of the functions in B taking values in K. Clearly, B = B (R). Since S is finite
we can identify B to RS . DefineM(B,K) as the set of closed and compact subset of B(K). In other words
M(B,K) is the set of menus on B(K). We denote byM0(B, u) the set of finite menus inM(B,K). We let
that 0 ∈ int(u), hence without loss of generality we put u = [−a, a] where a ∈ R+.
Lemma 3. If < on M satisfies A1-A4 and A7 then there exists a continuous function W :M(B, u) → R
such that (i), (ii) holds
(i) For all f ∈ F , there exists a probability vector µ ∈ RS such that W ({u(f)}) = T ({f}) = Eµu(f).
(ii) For all ∪ni=1{fi} ∈ M0, W (∪ni=1{u(fi)}) = T (∪ni=1{fi}).
Proof. (i) this is an immediate consequences of Ascombe-Aumann Theorem because all conditions for sin-
gletons hold. Turn to (ii): by lemma 2 we have A < B if and only if T (A) < T (B). Let Ψ :M0 →M0(B, u)
where Ψ(∪ni=1{fi}) = ∪ni=1{u ◦ fi} and such that for A ∼ B with A,B ∈ M0 we have Ψ(A) = Ψ(B).
From A7, if {fi(s)} ∼ {gi(s)} for all s ∈ S and for all i = 1, . . . , n then ∪ni=1{fi} ∼ ∪ni=1{gi}, hence
Ψ(∪ni=1{fi}) = Ψ(∪ni=1{gi}). Therefore we get a weak order <′ on M0(B, u) such that
∪ni=1{fi} < ∪ni=1{gi} ⇔ Ψ(∪ni=1{fi}) <′ Ψ(∪ni=1{gi}).
Clearly, <′ satisfies A1-A7, hence W (∪ni=1{u ◦ fi}) = T (∪ni=1{fi}) is well defined.
By abus of notation we write <′=<.
2.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We define the comonotonic cone of ϕ ∈ B(u) ⊂ B by the set of all acts that is ordered by identix way
each of their componments. We denote this comonotonic cone by
Cρ := {ϕ ∈ B(u) : ϕ(sρ(1)) 6 ϕ(sρ(2)) 6 . . . 6 ϕ(sρ(S))} (7)
where ρ is inclued in the set of all bijective mapping from S to S.
Step 1: We prove that the temptation relation is represented by a linear function Iρ : B → R such that
8Where y∗ and y∗ are the constant acts such that for all f ∈ F , {y∗} < {f} < {y∗}
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for all ϕ,ψ ∈ Cρ we have {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} if and only if Iρ(ψ) > Iρ(ϕ), where Iρ(ϕ) =
∑
s∈S pi
ρ(s)ϕ(s) with
piρ ∈ RS is a unique probability vector.
Step 2: Let ϕ ∈ Cρ and ψ ∈ Cρˆ, we show that there exists a unique non zero linear form Q : B → R such
that {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} if and only if Q(ψ) > Iρ(ϕ).
Step 3: We show that for any ψ ∈ Cρˆ, Q(ψ) =
∑
s∈S pi
ρˆ(s)ψ(s).
Step 4: We construct a capacity υ : 2S → [0, 1] such that for all ϕ,ψ ∈ B(u) we have
{ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} ⇔
∫
S
ψ(s)dυ(s) >
∫
S
ϕ(s)dυ(s).
Proof of Step 1: Take any ϕ ∈ Cρ: If {ϕ} ∼ {y∗} then by definition {ψ} < {ϕ} for all ψ ∈ Cρ, therefore
there is nothing to prove. If there don’t exists ψ ∈ Cρ such that {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ}, then putting piρ(s) = µ(s) for
all s ∈ S we get from lemma 3, Iρ(ϕ) = W ({ϕ}), hence A4 implies that W ({ϕ}) = W ({ϕ,ψ}) > W ({ψ})
for all ϕ,ψ ∈ Cρ such that {ϕ}  {ψ}, and we obtain the desired results. Turn now at the case where the
temptation relation is nontrivial on Cρ, namely there exists ϕ,ψ ∈ Cρ such that {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ}. Let the two
sets
Lρ(ϕ) :=
{
ψ ∈ Cρ : {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ}
}
and Kρ(ϕ) :=
{
ψ ∈ Cρ : {ϕ} ∼ {ϕ,ψ}  {ψ}
}
.
By non triviality of temptation Lρ(ϕ) is nonempty. It is the same for Kρ(ϕ). Indeed, pick λ ∈ R+ such that
ϕ − λ1S > y∗, obviously ϕ and ϕ − λ1S are comonotonics and ϕ − λ1S ∈ B(u). Hence A7 is satisfied and
we get {ϕ} ∼ {ϕ,ϕ− λ1S}  {ϕ− λ1S}, this implies that ϕ− λ1S ∈ Kρ(ϕ). Thus Kρ(ϕ) 6= ∅. It’s easy to
show that Kρ(ϕ) and Lρ(ϕ) are disjoints and it’s follow directly from A6, that are convex sets. Moreover
B is a finite dimensional vector space hence all conditions for the application of the separation Hyperplan
Theorem9 hold, Kρ(ϕ) and Lρ(ϕ) can be separated by a nonzero linear functional Jϕ : B → R and c ∈ R
such that
Jϕ(ψ) 6 c 6 Jϕ(ψ′) where ψ ∈ Kρ(ϕ) and ψ′ ∈ Lρ(ϕ). (8)
Since B ≡ RS , from Riesz Representation Theorem we can put Jϕ(·) = 〈qϕ, ·〉 where qϕ ∈ RS and qϕ 6= 0S .
Now we will show that Jϕ(ϕ) = c. For prove this we show that ϕ is a suppport point of cl(Kρ(ϕ)) and
cl(Lρ(ϕ)).
Lemma 4. ϕ is a support point of cl (Kρ(ϕ)) and cl (Lρ(ϕ)).
Proof. ϕ /∈ ri (Lρ(ϕ))10 since by definition ϕ /∈ Lρ(ϕ). Hence we have to show that ϕ is an boundary point
of Lρ(ϕ). To show this we prove that for all open neighborhood O ∈ RS of ϕ we have O ∩ Lρ(ϕ) 6= ∅.
For any Neighborhood O of ϕ by definition there exists an open ball centered at ϕ noted B(ϕ) ⊂ O with
 > 0. Pick ψ ∈ Lρ(ϕ), by A5 we get {ϕ}  {ϕ, αϕ + (1 − α)ψ} for all α ∈ (0, 1), putting α <  we have
9See Appendix 1
10ri(Lρ(ϕ)) 6= ∅ because Lρ(ϕ) is convex.
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αϕ + (1 − α)ψ ∈ B(ϕ)11. Therefore B(ϕ) ∩ Lρ(ϕ) 6= ∅, implying that ϕ ∈ cl (Lρ(ϕ)). By Theorem of
support points12, ϕ is a support points of cl (Lρ(ϕ)). By similar arguments with ψ ∈ Kρ(ϕ) we can show
that ϕ is a support point of cl (Kρ(ϕ)).
By above lemma, Jϕ is a supporting Hyperplan of cl (Kρ(ϕ)) and cl (Lρ(ϕ)) at ϕ. Hence we can put
Jϕ(ϕ) = c and we get
Jϕ(ψ) 6 Jϕ(ϕ) 6 Jϕ(ψ′) (9)
where ψ ∈ Kρ(ϕ) and ψ′ ∈ Lρ(ϕ). Moreover Jϕ(·) is a positive linear functionnals. Indeed if not we have
Jϕ(ϕ) 6 Jϕ(ϕ − λ1S) for all λ ∈ R+ such that ϕ − λ1S ∈ B(u). If Jϕ(ϕ) = Jϕ(ϕ − λ1S), then Jϕ(·) = 0
for all ψ ∈ B, contradicting the theorem of separation. If Jϕ(ϕ) < Jϕ(ϕ − λ1S) then equation (10) implies
that ϕ− λ1S ∈ Lρ(ϕ), but from A7 we get ϕ− λ1S ∈ Kρ(ϕ): contradiction, because Kρ(ϕ) and Lρ(ϕ) are
disjoints.
Lemma 5. If {ϕ}  {ψ} and Jϕ(ψ) = Jϕ(ϕ) then {ϕ} ∼ {ϕ,ψ}  {ψ}.
Proof. If ψ = y∗ then it’s follows directly from A7 that {ϕ} ∼ {ϕ,ψ}  {ψ}. Now we suppose that ψ 6= y∗.
By A2 {A ∈M(B, u) : {ϕ} ∼ A} is a closed set, thus by claim 2, if {ϕ} ∼ {ϕ,ψn} for all n ∈ N and that
limn→∞ ψn = ψ we have {ϕ} ∼ {ϕ,ψ}. Pick ψn = ψ − 1n+1δ1S where δ > 0 is such that ψ − δ1S ∈ B(u).
This ensure that ψn ∈ B(u) for all n. Hence A7 is satisfied and we get {ψ}  {ψ − 1n+1δ1S}. Since
Jϕ(·) is a positive nonzero linear functional we have Jϕ(ψ − 1n+1δ1S) < Jϕ(ψ) for all n. Moreover for
any ψ′, if {ϕ}  {ψ′} and Jϕ(ψ′) < Jϕ(ϕ) then {ϕ} ∼ {ϕ,ψ′}. Indeed suppose not: if {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ′},
then we have by equation (10) that Jϕ(ψ
′) > Jϕ(ϕ): in contradiction to Jϕ(ψ′) < Jϕ(ϕ). Therefore we
get {ϕ} ∼ {ϕ,ψ − 1n+1δ1S}  {ψ − 1n+1δ1S} for all n. Clearly limn→∞ ψn = ψ and by A2 we have
{ϕ} ∼ {ϕ,ψ}  {ψ} as desired.
By above lemma we can conclude that Jϕ(ψ) 6 Jϕ(ϕ) < Jϕ(ψ′) where ψ ∈ Kρ(ϕ) and ψ′ ∈ Lρ(ϕ). In
other words {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} if and only if Jϕ(ϕ) < Jϕ(ψ).
Lemma 6. There exists a unique probability vector piρϕ ∈ RS such that Jϕ(·) = 〈piρϕ, ·〉
Proof. We know that qϕ 6= 0 and because Jϕ is positive there are at least a s ∈ S such that qϕ(s) > 0. Hence∑
s∈S qϕ(s) > 0. Moreover {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ 〈αqϕ, ψ〉 > 〈αqϕ, ϕ〉 for all α > 0. Putting α = 1/
∑
s∈S qϕ(s) we
normalize qϕ by a probability vector of RS denoted by piρϕ and it is the unique probability vector representing
temptation as above.
Now we have to show that for any ϕ on Cρ, pi
ρ
ϕ is the unique probability vector representing the temptation
relation. Namely we must show that piρϕ = pi
ρ
ϕ′ for any ϕ,ϕ
′ ∈ Cρ. For this we let
11Indeed RS is a locally convex topological vector space.
12See Appendix 1
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Vϕ := {ψ ∈ Cρ : 〈piρϕ, ψ〉 = 〈piρϕ, ϕ〉} ∩ {ψ ∈ Cρ : {ϕ}  {ψ}},
and we define the binary relation  on Cρ × Cρ as follows:
{ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ ψ ∈ Vϕ.
The lemma 6 assure the unicity of a probability piρϕ for each ϕ ∈ Cρ, hence the set of acts ψ ∈ Cρ such that
{ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} is characterized by ψ ∈ Vϕ. In order to demonstrate the unicity of the probability we first
show that Vϕ is an affine subspace of dimension S − 1 for any ϕ ∈ Cρ and secondly we show that for any
ϕ and ϕ′, the sets Vϕ and Vϕ′ are parallel. Hence the linear forms associated to Vϕ and Vϕ′ are such that
piρϕ′ = βpi
ρ
ϕ for β ∈ R. Since piρϕ′ is a probability we have necessarily β = 1, hence piρϕ′ = piρϕ. So we can
conclude that if Vϕ and Vϕ′ are parallel affine subspaces then pi
ρ
ϕ = pi
ρ
ϕ′ .
Definition 8. A subset A of RS is an affine subspace if and only if for all m ∈ N∗, for all (α1, . . . , αm) ∈ Rm
such that α1 + . . .+ αm = 1 and for all ψ1, . . . , ψm ∈ A, α1ψ1 + . . .+ αmψm ∈ A.
Lemma 7. Vϕ and αVϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ are affine subspaces. Moreover dim(Vϕ) = dim(αVϕ+(1−α)ϕ′) = S−1.
Proof. First we show that Vϕ is an affine subspace. Take m ∈ N∗, ψ1, . . . , ψ′m ∈ Vϕ, and any (α1, . . . , αm) ∈
Rm such that α1 + . . .+αm = 1. Then by definition, {ϕ}  {ψi} and 〈piρϕ, ϕ〉 = 〈piρϕ, ψi〉 for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
From A3
{ϕ}  {ψ} ⇔ {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ}  {αϕ+ (1− α)ψ}
{ϕ}  {ψ′} ⇔ {αϕ+ (1− α)ψ}  {αψ′ + (1− α)ψ}
and from transitivity we get {ϕ}  {αψ′ + (1 − α)ψ}. By repeating A3 and transitivity we get {ϕ} 
{α1ψ1 + . . . + αmψm}, and by linearity of 〈piρϕ, ·〉: 〈piρϕ,
∑m
i=1 αiψi〉 =
∑m
i=1 αi〈piρϕ, ψi〉 = 〈piρϕ, ψi〉 = 〈piρϕ, ϕ〉.
Hence
∑m
i=1 αiψi ∈ Vϕ.
Now we show that dim(Vϕ) = S − 1. Since Vϕ is an affine subspace and that 0S ∈ Vϕ − {ψ′} for any
ψ′ ∈ Vϕ, it’s follows that Vϕ − {ψ′} is a vector subspace of RS for any ψ′ ∈ Vϕ. Moreover 〈piρϕ, ψ − ψ′〉 = 0
since ψ,ψ′ ∈ Vϕ. Therefore Vϕ − {ψ′} = ker(Hϕ) for any ψ′ ∈ Vϕ, thus dim(Vϕ) = S − 1. The proof for
αVϕ + (1− α)ϕ is the same.
Lemma 8. Vϕ and αVϕ + (1− α)ϕ′ are parralel affine subspaces.
Proof. Let Vϕ+{x0} where {x0} = (α−1)ϕ+(1−α)ϕ′. Hence by definition we get αϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ ∈ Vϕ+{x0}.
Obviously Vϕ and Vϕ + {x0} are parralel. Denote by H(Vϕ) the hyperplan generated by Vϕ. Its follows
directly that H(Vϕ + {x0}) = H(Vϕ) + {x0}. So we get:
H(Vϕ + {x0}) := {ψ ∈ B(2S) : 〈piρϕ, ψ〉 = 〈piρϕ, αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′〉}
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We can observe that for any ψ ∈ Vϕ we have αψ + (1− α)ϕ′ ∈ αVϕ + (1− α)ϕ′ if and only if any we have
〈piρϕ, ψ′〉 = 〈piρϕ, αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′〉.
Moreover we have αVϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′ ∩ Vϕ + {x0} 6= ∅. From this remark its comes that αVϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′ ⊂
H(Vϕ+{x0}). Thanks to lemma 7, dim(αVϕ+(1−α)ϕ′) = S−1, thereforeH(αVϕ+(1−α)ϕ′) = H(Vϕ+{x0}),
this conclude the proof.
Lemma 9. Vϕ and Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ are parallel affine subspaces.
Proof. We argue by contradiction: suppose that Vϕ and Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ are not parallel. Take Vϕ + {x0}, the
translated affine subspace of Vϕ such that ϕ + {x0} = αϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′. Therefore Vϕ + {x0} is parallel to
Vϕ and Vϕ + {x0} ∩ Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ 6= ∅ since αϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′ ∈ Vϕ + {x0} ∩ Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ . Clearly we have
αVϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′ ⊂ Vϕ + {x0}. From lemma 8 we have that dim(αVϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′) = S − 1, therefore the
hyperplan generates by αVϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ and by Vϕ+{x0} are the same, and we can deduce that αVϕ+(1−α)ϕ′
and Vϕ are parallel affine subspaces. Moreover from A5 we have by taking ϕ,ψ ∈ Vϕ:
{ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′}  {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′, αψ + (1− α)ϕ′},
and by linearity of 〈piρϕ, ·〉, we have
〈piρ, ϕ〉 = 〈piρ, ψ〉 ⇔ 〈piρϕ, αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′〉 = 〈piρ, αψ + (1− α)ϕ′〉.
Therefore we can deduce that
{αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′}  {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′, αψ + (1− α)ϕ′} ⇔ 〈piρϕ, αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′〉 = 〈piρϕ, αψ + (1− α)ϕ′〉,
in other words
ψ ∈ αVϕ + (1− α)ϕ′ ⇒ {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′}  {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′, ψ}. (10)
However by hypothesis αVϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′ and Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ are not parralel, so we have αVϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′ 6=
Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ and since αVϕ + (1− α)ϕ′ ∩ Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ 6= ∅ we get by definition that dim(αVϕ + (1− α)ϕ′ ∩
Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′) = S − 2. So there exists at least a ψ ∈ αVϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′ such that ψ /∈ Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ . In other
words by (11) {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′}  {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′, ψ} and ψ /∈ Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ , this is a contradiction because
{αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′}  {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′, ψ} if and only if ψ ∈ Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ .
With the same type of argument we proove that piραϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ = pi
ρ
ϕ′ . We have showed that pi
ρ
ϕ = pi
ρ
ϕ′ for
any ϕ,ϕ′ ∈ Cρ. Now it’s easy to see that
{ϕ} ∼ {ϕ,ψ} ⇔
{
{ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ 〈piρ, ϕ〉 = 〈piρ, ψ〉
{ϕ} ' {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ 〈piρ, ϕ〉 > 〈piρ, ψ〉
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Thus unicity of piρ with regard to  implies the unicity of piρ for the temptation relation on Cρ×Cρ. Hence
for any ϕ,ψ ∈ Cρ such that {ϕ}  {ψ} we have {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ 〈piρ, ψ〉 > 〈piρ, ϕ〉. This conclude the proof
of step 1.
Proof of Step 2: In this step we show that there exists a linear functional Qϕ(·) : B → R such that
{ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ Qϕ(ψ) > Iρ(ϕ) (11)
Where ϕ ∈ Cρ, ψ ∈ Cρˆ and {ϕ}  {ψ}. Let the following sets:
NT+ :=
{
ψ ∈ Cρˆ : {ψ} ∼ {ψ,ϕ}  {ϕ}
}
and T+ :=
{
ψ ∈ Cρˆ : {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ}
}
T− :=
{
ψ ∈ Cρˆ : {ψ}  {ψ,ϕ}
}
and NT− :=
{
ψ ∈ Cρˆ : {ϕ} ∼ {ϕ,ψ}  {ψ}
}
We have two case: {y∗} ∼ {ϕ}  {y∗} or {y∗}  {ϕ}  {y∗}.
First we analyse the case where {y∗}  {ϕ}  {y∗}. Let Z+(ϕ) := NT+ ∪T+ and Z−(ϕ) := T− ∪NT−.
First Z+(ϕ) and Z−(ϕ) are nonempty since from A7, Cρˆ∩{ψ : ψ(s)  ϕ(s),∀s ∈ S}∩{ψ : ϕ(s)  ψ(s),∀s ∈
S} is nonempty, thus NT+ and NT− are nonempty. We denote by co(·) the convex hull of any set in B(u).
Lemma 10. ri(coZ+(ϕ)) ∩ ri(coZ−(ϕ)) = ∅.
Proof. Since NT+, T+, NT− and T− are convex from A6, we get coZ+(ϕ) = λNT+ + (1 − λ)T+ and
coZ−(ϕ) = λNT−+(1−λ)T− with λ ∈ [0, 1]. Since ψ0 ∈ NT+ ⇒ {ψ0}  {ϕ} and ψ1 ∈ T+ ⇒ {ϕ}  {ψ1},
there exists λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that λ∗ψ0 + (1− λ∗)ψ1 ∈ coZ+(ϕ) and {λ∗ψ0 + (1− λ∗)ψ1} ∼ {ϕ}. Hence for
λ < λ∗ we get λψ0 + (1− λ)ψ1 ∈ T+ and for λ > λ∗ we get λψ0 + (1− λ)ψ1 ∈ NT+. In other words
coZ+(ϕ) =
{
ψ ∈ Cρˆ : {ψ} ∼ {ϕ} or ψ ∈ NT+ or ψ ∈ T+
}
coZ−(ϕ) =
{
ψ ∈ Cρˆ : {ψ} ∼ {ϕ} or ψ ∈ NT− or ψ ∈ T−
}
Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists ψ ∈ ri(coZ+(ϕ)) ∩ ri(coZ−(ϕ)):
Case 1: If {ψ}  {ϕ}, then we get {ψ} ∼ {ψ,ϕ} and {ψ}  {ψ,ϕ}: contradiction.
Case 2: If {ϕ}  {ψ}, then we get {ϕ} ∼ {ϕ,ψ} and {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ}: contradiction.
Case 3: If {ψ} ∼ {ϕ}, then there exists an open ball centered at ψ with  > 0 such that for all ψ′ ∈ B(ψ)
we have ψ′ ∈ ri(coZ+(ϕ)) ∩ ri(coZ−(ϕ)). Take ψ′ = ψ − λ1S with λ < . Clearly ψ′ ∈ B(ψ) and from
A7, {ψ}  {ψ′}. Hence {ϕ}  {ψ′}, from case 2 we get a contradiction. Thus we have to shown that
ri(co(Z+(ϕ)) ∩ ri(coZ−(ϕ)) = ∅
Hence we can apply Hyperplan Theorem, there exists a nonull linear functional Qϕ : B0 → R and a ∈ R
such that
Qϕ(ψ) 6 a 6 Qϕ(ψ′) where ψ ∈ co(Z−(ϕ)) and ψ′ ∈ co(Z+(ϕ)). (12)
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Since by hypothesis {y∗}  {ϕ}  {y∗} NT+ and NT− are nonempty, we have Cρˆ ∩ {ψ : ψ(s)  ϕ(s),∀s ∈
S} ⊂ NT+ and Cρˆ ∩ {ψ : ϕ(s)  ψ(s),∀s ∈ S}. It follows that Qϕ(·) is a positive linear functional. Indeed
suppose not, then this implies that for y1S , y
′1S such that {y1S}  {ϕ(s)}  {y′1S} for all s ∈ S we
have Qϕ(y
′1S) > Qϕ(y1S). If Qϕ(y′1S) = Qϕ(y1S) then Qϕ(·) is null, this is impossible. If Qϕ(y′1S) >
Qϕ(y1S) > a, then this implies that y′1S ∈ Z+(ϕ), in contradiction with A7.
Lemma 11. If ψ ∈ Cρˆ and Qϕ(ψ) = a, then {ϕ} ∼ {ϕ,ψ} if {ϕ}  {ψ}, and {ψ} ∼ {ψ,ϕ} if {ψ}  {ϕ}.
Proof. Since Qϕ(·) is a nonull positive linear functional, this lemma holds with the same types of arguments
as in lemma 5.
Therefore we get for ϕ ∈ Cρ and ψ ∈ Cρˆ:
{ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ Qϕ(ψ) > a (13)
{ψ} ∼ {ψ,ϕ}  {ϕ} ⇔ Qϕ(ψ) > a (14)
{ϕ} ∼ {ϕ,ψ}  {ψ} ⇔ Qϕ(ψ) 6 a (15)
{ψ}  {ψ,ϕ} ⇔ Qϕ(ψ) < a (16)
Hence we can deduce the following lemma:
Lemma 12. There exists a unique probability vector γρˆ ∈ RS such that Qϕ(·) = 〈γρˆ, ·〉
Proof. By (14)-(17), the proof is the same of lemma 6.
Lemma 13. Iρ(ϕ) = a.
Proof. By definition any constant act y1S ∈ Cρ ∩ Cρˆ. Suppose by contradiction that Iρ(ϕ) 6= a. If Iρ(ϕ) =
c > a. Then there exists b ∈ R such that a > b > c. We have two case. If {b1S}  {ϕ}, then from step
1 one we get {b1S} ∼ {b1S , ϕ}, and from (17) we get {b1S}  {b1S , ϕ}: contradiction. If {ϕ}  {b1S},
then from Step 1 we get {ϕ}  {ϕ, b1S} and from (16) we get {ϕ} ∼ {ϕ, b1S}: contradiction. Now suppose
Iρ(ϕ) = c < a, pick b ∈ R such that a < b < c, we have again two cases. If {b1S}  {ϕ}, then from Step 1
{b1S}  {b1S , ϕ} and from (15) we get {b1S} ∼ {b1S , ϕ}: contradiction. If {ϕ}  {b1S}, then from Step 1
{ϕ} ∼ {ϕ, bS} and from (14) we get {ϕ}  {ϕ, b1S}: contradiction. Hence Iρ(ϕ) = a.
Now we analyse the case where {ϕ} ∼ {y∗}. We have two possibilities T+ 6= ∅ or T+ = ∅. By definition
of y∗ we have {y∗} < {ϕ} for all ϕ ∈ B(u). In other words ϕ(s) 6 y∗ for all s ∈ S, hence {ϕ} ∼ {y∗} if and
only if ϕ(s) = y∗ for all s ∈ S. Therefore {ϕ} ∼ {y∗} if and only if ϕ is a constant act.
If T+ 6= ∅. Since ϕ ∈ Cρ ∩ Cρˆ the results follow directly from step 1.
If T+ = ∅. Put Qϕ(·) = 〈µ, ·〉, and we have the desired results.
Now we want to show that for any ϕ ∈ Cρ, γρˆϕ is the unique probability vector representing the temptation
relation betweenn Cρ and Cρˆ. Namely we show that γ
ρˆ
ϕ = γ
ρˆ
ϕ′ . For this we define the following sets:
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Vˆ 1ϕ := {ψ ∈ Cρˆ : 〈piρ, ϕ〉 = 〈γρˆϕ, ψ〉} ∩ {ψ ∈ Cρˆ : {ψ}  {ϕ}}
Vˆ 2ϕ := {ψ ∈ Cρˆ : 〈piρ, ϕ〉 = 〈γρˆϕ, ψ〉} ∩ {ψ ∈ Cρˆ : {ϕ}  {ψ}}
and let the binary relation  on B(u)×B(u) such that:
{ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ ψ ∈ Vˆϕ
where ϕ ∈ Cρ and ψ ∈ Cρˆ. The lemma 12 assure the unicity of a probability γρˆϕ for each ϕ ∈ Cρ, hence the
set of acts ψ ∈ Cρˆ such that {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} is characterized by ψ ∈ Vˆϕ. We can remark that  satisfied A6.
By similar arguments of lemma 7 and 8 we can show that Vˆϕ and αVˆϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′ are parallel affine
subspaces of dimension of S − 1.
Lemma 14. Vˆϕ and Vˆαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ are parallel affine subspaces.
Proof. We argue by contradiction: suppose that Vϕ and Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ are not parallel. Take Vϕ + {x0}, the
translated affine subspace of Vϕ such that ϕ + {x0} = αϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′. Therefore Vϕ + {x0} is parallel to
Vϕ and Vϕ + {x0} ∩ Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ 6= ∅ since αϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′ ∈ Vϕ + {x0} ∩ Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ . Clearly we have
αVϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′ ⊂ Vϕ + {x0}. From lemma 8 we have that dim(αVϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′) = S − 1, therefore the
hyperplan generates by αVϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ and by Vϕ+{x0} are the same, and we can deduce that αVϕ+(1−α)ϕ′
and Vϕ are parallel affine subspaces. Moreover from A6 we have
{ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′}  {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′, αψ + (1− α)ϕ′},
and by linearity of 〈piρϕ, ·〉, we have
〈piρ, ϕ〉 = 〈piρ, ψ〉 ⇔ 〈piρϕ, αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′〉 = 〈piρ, αψ + (1− α)ϕ′〉.
Therefore we can deduce that
{αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′}  {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′, αψ + (1− α)ϕ′} ⇔ 〈piρϕ, αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′〉 = 〈piρϕ, αψ + (1− α)ϕ′〉,
for any ψ ∈ Vϕ. In other words
ψ ∈ αVϕ + (1− α)ϕ′ ⇒ {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′}  {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′, ψ}. (17)
However by hypothesis αVϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′ and Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ are not parralel, so we have αVϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′ 6=
Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ and since αVϕ + (1− α)ϕ′ ∩ Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ 6= ∅ we get by definition that dim(αVϕ + (1− α)ϕ′ ∩
Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′) = S − 2. So there exists at least a ψ ∈ αVϕ + (1 − α)ϕ′ such that ψ /∈ Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ . In other
words by (11) {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′}  {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′, ψ} and ψ /∈ Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ , this is a contradiction because
{αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′}  {αϕ+ (1− α)ϕ′, ψ} if and only if ψ ∈ Vαϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ .
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With the same type of argument we proove that piραϕ+(1−α)ϕ′ = pi
ρ
ϕ′ . We have showed that pi
ρ
ϕ = pi
ρ
ϕ′ for
any ϕ,ϕ′ ∈ Cρ. Now it’s easy to see that
{ϕ} ∼ {ϕ,ψ} ⇔
{
{ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ 〈piρ, ϕ〉 = 〈piρ, ψ〉
{ϕ} ' {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ 〈piρ, ϕ〉 > 〈piρ, ψ〉
Thus unicity of piρ with regard to  implies the unicity of piρ for the temptation relation on Cρ×Cρ. Hence
for any ϕ,ψ ∈ Cρ such that {ϕ}  {ψ} we have {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ 〈piρ, ψ〉 > 〈piρ, ϕ〉. This conclude the proof
of step 2.
Proof of Step 3: We show that {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ 〈piρˆ, ψ〉 > 〈piρ, ϕ〉. From step 1 we know that {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ}
if and only if 〈piρ, ψ〉 > 〈piρ, ϕ〉 for ϕ,ψ ∈ Cρ, and, {ϕ′}  {ϕ′, ψ′} if and only if 〈piρˆ, ψ′〉 > 〈piρˆ, ϕ′〉 for any
ϕ′, ψ′ ∈ Cρˆ. On the other hand, from step 2 {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ′} if and only if 〈γρˆ, ψ〉 > 〈piρ, ϕ〉 for any ϕ ∈ Cρ and
any ψ ∈ Cρˆ. Pick y an any constant act, then by definition y ∈ Cρ∩Cρˆ, since by step 1 there exists a unique
probability representing the temptation relation on Cρˆ we have necessarily γ
ρˆ = piρˆ. Moreover by step 2 the
unicity of probability representing the temptation relation between Cρ and Cρˆ implies γ
ρˆ
ϕ = γ
ρˆ
y = pi
ρˆ, hence
for any ϕ ∈ Cρ and any ψ ∈ Cρˆ
{ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ 〈piρˆ, ψ〉 > 〈piρ, ϕ〉.
Proof of Step 4: Take 1E where E ⊂ S. If 1E ∈ Cρ ∩ Cρˆ then by Step 3 we get piρ(E) = piρˆ(E). If not
define υ : 2S → [0, 1] a follows:
υ(E) = piρ(E)
for any ρ such that 1E ∈ Cρ. We remark that υ is monotone, indeed let E ⊆ F there exists some ρˆ such
that 1E , 1F ∈ Cρˆ. Thus υ(E) = piρˆ(E) 6 piρˆ(F ) = υ(F ). By definition υ(∅) = 0 and υ(S) = 1. Hence
υ is a capacity. Suppose that F = E ∪ {sˆ} for some sˆ /∈ E. Then for any ρˆ with 1E , 1F ∈ Cρˆ, we have
υ(F )− υ(E) = piρˆ(sˆ). Thus for any ϕ ∈ B0(u) and any ρ such that ϕ ∈ Cρ,
〈piρ, ϕ〉 = ϕ(sρ(1))υ(Eρ1 ) +
|S|∑
k=2
ϕ(sρ(k))
[
υ(Eρk)− υ(Eρk−1)
]
where Eρk := {sρ(1), . . . , sρ(k)}. This expresion is the Choquet-Expected value of ϕ with the capacity υ.
Hence by Step 3 we have for ϕ ∈ Cρ and ψ ∈ Cρˆ, {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ 〈piρˆ, ψ〉 > 〈piρ, ϕ〉, thus ψ tempts ϕ if and
only if:
ψ(sρˆ(1))υ(E
ρˆ
1 ) +
|S|∑
k=2
ψ(ρˆ(k))
[
υ(Eρˆk)− υ(Eρˆk−1)
]
> ϕ(sρ(1))υ(E
ρ
1 ) +
|S|∑
k=2
ϕ(sρ(k))
[
υ(Eρk)− υ(Eρk−1)
]
.
By lemma 3 we know that {ϕ}  {ϕ,ψ} ⇔ {f}  {f, g} for f, g ∈ F such that u(f)(s) = ϕ(s) and
u(g)(s) = ψ(s) for all s ∈ S, thus
{f}  {f, g} ⇔ I(g) =
∫
S
u(g)dυ > I(f) =
∫
S
u(f)dυ,
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as desired, moreover I(·) is continuous. This concludes the proof of theorem 1.
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1-3
Proof of proposition 1:
Take f and g which are CEO and such that
∑
s∈S u(f) >
∑
s∈S u(g), hence we have {f}  {g}. For
simplicity assume first that maxs∈S f(s) ∼ maxs∈S g(s) and mins∈S f(s) ∼ mins∈S g(s). We get
{f}  {f,max
s∈S
f(s)1s + min
s∈S
f(s′)1s′}
I(f) = υ(s)u(f(s)) + (1− υ(s′))u(f(s′))
Proof of proposition 2:
(i)⇒ (ii): From Theorem 1  on F×F is equivalent to {f}  {g} and I(f) = I(g). Clearly if the temptation
relation satisfied A5” then  satisfied A5”. Therefore from Theorem 1 we get I(f) = I(g) = I(h) and
I(αg + (1− α)h) > I(f) = I(g) = I(h). In particular since I(g) = I(h) we have
I(g + h) = I(2(
1
2
g +
1
2
h)) = 2I(
1
2
g +
1
2
h) > I(g) + I(h) (18)
Let E,F two subsets of S, and assume w.l.o.g that υ(E) > υ(F ). Then there exists θ > 1 such that
υ(E) = θυ(F ). Therefore I(1E) = υ(F ) = θυ(F ) = I(θ1F ). From (19) we have I(1E+θ1F ) > I(1E)+I(θ1F ).
However we remark that 1E + θ1F = 1E∩F + (θ − 1)1F + 1E∪F . Moreover 1E∩F , (θ − 1)1F and 1E∪F are
comonotonic, so we obtain
I(1E∩F + (θ − 1)1F + 1E∪F ) = I(1E + θ1F ) > I(1E) + I(θ1F )
I(1E∩F ) + I((θ − 1)1F ) + I(1E∪F ) > I(1E) + I(θ1F )
υ(E ∩ F ) + (θ − 1)υ(F ) + υ(E ∪ F ) > υ(E) + θυ(F )
υ(E ∩ F ) + υ(E ∪ F ) > υ(E) + υ(F )
So υ is a convex capacity. The proof of (ii)⇒ (i) is obvious.
Proof of proposition 3:
The proof is similar to proof of proposition 2.
Appendix 4: Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 15. For all f, g, h ∈ F with {f}  {f, g}  {g} then CEU(h) 6 CEU(g)⇒ {f, h} < {f, g}
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Proof. The first case where {h} < {g}, by Theorem 1 we have EU(f) > EU(g) and CEU(g) > CEU(f).
Take h′ in the comonotonic cone of h (denoted C(h)). We have two case: there exists h′ comonotonic to h
such that {h′}  {h′, h}, or there don’t exists h′ in comonotonic cone of h who is tempted by h.
Case 1: There exists h′ ∈ C(h) such that {h′}  {h′, h}.
By Theorem 1 CEU(h′) < CEU(h) and EU(h′) > EU(h). By hypothesis we get EU(h′αh) > EU(g) and
CEU(g) > CEU(h′αh) and by Theorem 1 {h′αh}  {h′αh, g}. Therefore by Temptation-Aversion axiom
{f, h′αh} < {f, g} for all α ∈ (0, 1), by continuity as α→ 0, {f, h} < {f, g}13.
Case 2: There don’t exists h′ ∈ C(h) such that {h′}  {h′, h}.
This implies that CEU(h) = EU(h) on C(h). Suppose that {h}  {g} and take h′ such that {h} 
{h′}  {g}, hence we get CEU(h′) < CEU(g), moreover EU(h′αh) > EU(g) and CEU(g) > CEU(h′αh),
therefore Theorem 1 {h′αh}  {h′αh, g} and Temptation-Aversion implies {f, h′αh} < {f, g}, as α→ 0 we
get {f, h} < {f, g}. Now suppose that {h} ∼ {g}, Take h′ comontonic to h and such that {h}  {h′}, then
CEU(h) > CEU(h′), thus CEU(hαh′) < CEU(g) and EU(g) > EU(hαh′) and theorem 1 implies that
{g} ∼ {g, hαh′}  {hαh′}, by temptation aversion we get {f, hαh′} < {f, g}. Take α → 1 and we obtain
{f, h} < {f, g}.
Next suppose that {g}  {h}, if {g}  {g, h} we have by Theorem 1 CEU(h) > CEU(g) which contradict
the assumption, hence Set-Betweenness implies {g} ∼ {g, h}  {h}. By Temptation-Aversion {f, h} <
{f, g}.
Define the correspondance L : I (F) F by L(l) := {g : I(g) 6 l}. By continuity of I, L(l) is nonempty
and compact set for each l. Define the self-control cost function by
c(f, g) = max
[
0, max
g∈L(l)
{
W ({u(f)})−W ({u(f), u(g)})
}]
Lemma 16. The conditions (i)− (vi) hold:
(i)For any f, l, if {f}  {f, g}  {g} for some g with CEU(g) = l, then c(f, l) = u(f)−W ({f, g})
(ii) For any f, l, if {f}  {f, g} for some g ∈ L(l), then c(f, l) > 0
(iii) For any f, l, if l 6 CEU(f), then c(f, l) = 0
(iv) If u(f) > u(g) and l = max{f,g} CEU , then CEU(f) < CEU(g)⇔ c(f, g) > 0
(v) For any f , c(f, ·) is weakly increasing
(vi) The function c is continuous
Proof. See Lemma 3 of Noor and Takeoka (2010)
13See claim 2 in Appendix 1
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Lemma 17. For all f, g ∈ F ,
W ({f, g}) = max
h∈{f,g}
{
u(h)− c
(
h,max
{f,g}
CEU
)}
. (19)
Proof. See Lemma 4 of Noor and Takeoka (2010)
Lemma 18. For all finite menus A ∈M (F),
W (A) = max
h∈A
{
u(h)− c
(
h,max
A
CEU
)}
. (20)
Proof. See Lemma 5 of Noor and Takeoka (2010)
Lemma 19. For all A ∈M (F), W can be written as the desired form.
Proof. By lemma 0 of GP (2001), there exists a sequence of subset An of A such that each An is finite and
An → A in the Hausdorff metric. By lemma 8,
W (An) = max
h∈An
{
u(h)− c
(
h,max
An
CEU
)}
. (21)
Since by (vi) of lemma 5 c is continuous, the maximum theorem implies that the right-hand side of (18)
converge to
max
h∈A
{
u(h)− c
(
h,max
A
CEU
)}
. (22)
On the other hand, by (ii) of lemma 1, W (An)→W (A). This conclude the proof of Theorem 2.
Appendix 5: Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 20. c(f,maxg∈A v(g)) = c(f + θ1S ,maxg∈A v(g + θ1s))
Proof. By lemma ?? W (f + θ1S , g + θ1S) = W (f, g) + u(θ1S), so we have
u(f + θ1S)− c(f + θ1S ,max
g∈A
v(g + θ1S)) = u(f)− c(f,max
g∈A
v(g)) + u(θ1S),
by the additivity of u we get u(f + θ1S) = u(f) + u(θ1S), therefore
c(f + θ1S ,max
g∈A
v(g + θ1S)) = c(f,max
g∈A
v(g))
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Moreover the function c(f, v(g)) = c(v(f), v(g)). Indeed suppose that CEU(f) 6 CEU(f ′), then by lemma
15 we get {f ′, h} < {f, h}.
c(f + θ1S , v(h+ θ1S)) = c(f, h)
, thus
c(f + θ1S , v(h)) 6 c(f + θ1S , v(h+ θ1S)) = c(f, h),
therefore we can rewrite c(f, v(h)) as c(v(f), v(h)).
Lemma 21. Let {f}  {f, g}  {g} and {f ′}  {f ′, g′}  {g′}. (i) and (ii) holds
(i) v(g′) > v(g)⇒ c(v(f), v(g′)) > c(v(f), v(g))
(ii) v(f) > v(f ′)⇒ c(v(f ′), v(g)) > c(v(f), v(g))
Proof. (i) follows directly of the definition of the function c(f, v(g)). Turn to (ii) by lemma 20 we know that
c(v(f ′), v(g)) = c(v(f ′) + θ1S , v(g) + θ1S).
Since v(f) > v(f ′), putting θ = [v(f)− v(f ′)]1S we get v(f) = v(f ′) + θ1S . So,
c(v(f ′), v(g)) = c(v(f ′) + θ1S , v(g) + θ1S) = c(v(f), v(g) + θ1S).
Since v(f) > v(f ′) we have that θ > 0, so v(g) + θ1S > v(g). By (i) it’s comes
c(v(f ′), v(g)) = c(v(f), v(g) + θ1S) > c(v(f), v(g)).
Lemma 22. Let {f}  {f, g}  {g} and {f ′}  {f ′, g′}  {g′}, then
v(g′)− v(f ′) > v(g)− v(f)⇒ c(v(f ′), v(g′)) > c(v(f), v(g))
Proof. Clearly we have v(g′)− v(f ′) > v(g)− v(f)⇔ v(g′ + θ1S)− v(f ′ + θ1S) > v(g)− v(f). Putting θ1S
such that v(g′) + θ1S = v(g) then v(f ′) + θ1S 6 v(f), we have by (ii) of lemma 21:
c(v(f ′ + θ1S), v(g′ + θ1S)) = c(v(f ′ + θ1S), v(g)) > c(v(f), v(g))
We can conclude the proof of theorem 3. By lemma 22 we have
v(f ′)− v(g′) = v(f)− v(g)⇔ c(v(f ′), v(g′)) = c(v(f), v(g))
So the following function:
c(f, v(g)) = φ(v(g)− v(f))
28
is well defined.
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